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INTRODUCTION

In addition to sharing defendant status in the most recognizable
mass-tort litigations in the United States, tobacco and asbestos companies have themselves been erstwhile adverse litigants. The fray between asbestos and tobacco companies arose from the former's
industry's efforts to defray its ever burdensome liability load.' One
can trace the first volleys between these two industries to asbestos defendants' attempts to attain apportionment of damages in actions involving smoker-plaintiffs who are claiming asbestos-related injuries.
Although tobacco companies are not parties in these cases, asbestos
defendants argue that plaintiffs' tobacco use triggers an offset of liabil2
ity under the doctrine of comparative negligence.
In 1997, riding the wave of third-party civil actions that healthcare insurers brought against the tobacco industry under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),- certain asbestos defendants brought their own contribution claims against the
tobacco industry. This Note discusses the import of one of these actions, Falise v. American Tobacco Co., which was adjudicated before
4
Judge Weinstein in the Eastern District of New York.
I See discussion infra Part I.A.
2 See discussion infra Part I.B.
3 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified .as amended at 18 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1962-1968 (2002)).
4 Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
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Many courts consider Falise to be a doctrinal outlier and criticize
it for being at odds with precedent concerning proximate cause in
RICO actions. 5 Indeed, the ultimate outcome of Falise-a mistrialand the subsequent withdrawal of similar suits in other jurisdictions"
suggest that it is not only a liminal case, but also moot. This Note
argues, however, that in light of (1) the asbestos litigation crisis, 7 (2)
ample evidence concerning the synergistic effects between smoking
and asbestos exposure," and (3) the ineffectiveness of traditional contribution and apportionment regimes as applied to asbestos defendants, Judge Weinstein's analysis is rightly-minded and, at the very least,
illustrates the need for better contribution mechanisms to address asbestos defendants' liability dilemma.
Part I of this Note summarizes the state of the asbestos litigation
and the asbestos defendants' attempts to relieve their overwhelming
liability burden. Part II discusses the background of Falise, including
its facts, the general claims alleged, and the outcome. Part III dissects
the Falise court's analysis and distinguishes it from other RICO thirdparty actions. It also proffers (1) rationales for better contribution
devices as well as (2) justifications of the Falise court's use of RICO.
Part IV concludes that Falise is distinguishable from other RICO contribution claims against tobacco companies. Tort defendants who
find themselves in a similar predicament as the asbestos defendants
need relief mechanisms, and RICO provides an innovative solution to
the apportionment and contribution issue.

5

See, e.g., E. States Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 729 N.Y.S.2d 240,

248-49 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (refusing to follow Judge Weinstein's decisions in Blue Cross
& Blue Shield (4'NezJerso,, Inc. v. Philip Moris, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 221 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) and
noting that one court has criticized the opinion as a "'thinly disguised refusal to accept
and follow the Second Circuit's holding'" in Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit lund v. Philip
Moriis, Inc., 191 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1080 (2000), in which the
Second Circuit dismissed a health fund's third-party contribution claim against tobacco
companies for remoteness (citing Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734 Health & Welfare
Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 196 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 1999))); see also Asbestos Products
Company Abandons Lawsuit Against Tobacco Companies; Similar Case Dismissed in Mississippi,
Bus. WIRE, July 27, 2001, WESTLAW, AllNewsPlus File [hereinafter Asbestos Products] (quoting Philip Morris Associate General Counsel William S. Ohlemeyer as stating that "[c]ourts
across the country have consistently dismissed similar reimbursement cases because the
connection between the conduct at issue and the damages being claimed is indirect, remote and speculative").
(' See Asbestos Products, supra note 5.
7 See discussion infra Part L.A (discussing increasing number of bankruptcies among
traditional and even non-traditional asbestos defendants).
8 See discussion infra Part l.B.
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I
THE CURRENT STATE OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION

A.

Asbestos Defendants' Search for Litigation Relief

The year 2001 brought with it two more companies, Federal-Mogul and USG Corp., filing for bankruptcy to shield themselves from
asbestos lawsuits.2' These companies joined the approximately thirty
companies"' that have filed for bankruptcy and reorganization in the
form of a trust to settle asbestos claims since Johns-Manville filed the
first Chapter 11 petition on August 26, 1982.1'
Over the years, as the impact and breadth of asbestos litigation in
the United States has escalated at an expedited pace,' 2 asbestos manu-

facturers and peripheral defendants have explored various avenues in
addition to bankruptcy to reduce liability exposure. " For example, to
alleviate case management and administrative costs, asbestos manufacturers, in coordination with certain plaintiffs' attorneys, have attempted to attain class certification for asbestos plaintiffs and a
subsequent class settlement.14 In addition, given the large number of
claimants who were exposed to asbestos in naval shipyards, asbestos
defendants have brought suit against the U.S. government for contribution. 15 Most recently, some asbestos defendants have even filed a
RICO conspiracy claim against certain asbestos plaintiffs' attorneys,
alleging strong-arm settlement tactics and conspiracy to inundate defendants with meritless claims.' 6 Over the past twenty years, asbestos
defendants have also lobbied extensively for legislative action to ad9 See Sandra Guy, USG Files Bankruptcy, CH]. SUN-TIMFS, June 26, 2001, at 45; Rhoda
Miel, Lawsuits Push Federal-Mogul to Chapter / 1, PLAsTics NEWS, Oct. 8, 2001, at 22.
o See Miel, supra note 9.
I
See PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MIS(.ONDNu F: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 3
(1985).
12 When Johns-Manville petitioned for Chapter 1l protection in 1982, the company
estimated that claimants would name it as a defendant "in at least 52,000 asbestos-disease
lawsuits before the litigation ran its course." Id. Nineteen years later, however, at the date
of its Chapter 1I filing, claimants have named USG in over 250,000 asbestos suits and its
personal injury costs per year exceeded $275,000,000. See Guy, supra note 9.
13 The asbestos litigation has also generated a substantial anount of peripheral insurance coverage litigation between asbestos manufacturers and their insurers, as well as between insurers and their reinsurers. See, e.g., hi re Liquidation of Midland hIs. Co., 269
A.D.2d 50 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000); Fibreboard Corp. v. Hartford Accidefnt & Indem. Co., 20
Cal. Rptr. 2d 376 (Ct. App. 1993).
14
SeeAmchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597-601 (1997).
15 See UNR Indus., Inc. v. United States, 911 F.2d 654 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Keene Corp. v.
United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 146 (1989);Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 1 (Cl.
Ct. 1987).
16 In G-I Holdings, Inc. v. Baron & Budd, the plaintiff G-I Holdings, Inc., brought a
RICO suit against the asbestos plaintiffs bar (Baron & Budd, Weitz & Luxenberg, and Ness,
Motley). The Southern District of New York, however, granted summary judgment as to
the RICO claim. See 179 F. Supp. 2d 233, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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dress the asbestos litigation morass. 17 These maneuvers to defray costs
and liability and to preclude resort to bankruptcy protection have
proven futile.'
Another tactic that asbestos defendants have recently explored to
obtain relief from their daunting liability load is to seek a contribution
from a sister mass-tort litigant-the tobacco industry.
B.

Tobacco and Asbestos: Joint Tortfeasors and Adverse
Litigants

The tobacco and asbestos industries have both figuratively and
literally met on numerous occasions in the courtroom. Asbestos defendants raise the issue of a particular plaintiffs smoking habit in
their defense strategies under two rubrics: (1) tobacco use by a claimant as a basis for apportionment of liability in the original action; and
(2) contribution from the tobacco industry in a separate action claiming the tobacco industry as a nonparty tortfeasor. The latter rubric is
the direct focus of this Note; however, it is useful to explicate the apportionment strategy, which is also a contribution strategy.
1. Apportionment Claims in the Original Action
Asbestos exposure is known to cause asbestosis, malignant
mesothelioma, lung cancer, and pleural plaques.19 These are all progressive and incurable ailments. 2 1 Whereas one can attribute asbestosis, mesothelioma, and pleural plaques solely to asbestos exposure,2 '
doctors most commonly attribute lung cancer to smoking.2 2 A signifi-.
cant number of claims against asbestos defendants have involved
smokers arguing that asbestos exposure caused their lung cancer. 23
Furthermore, since the 1980s, a growing consensus within the medical
community is that there is a distinct relationship between tobacco use
17

18

Legislators have proposed no less than ten distinct reforms. See Guy, supra note 9.
See generally G. Marcus Cole, A Calculus Without Consent: Mass Tort Bankruptcies, Fu-

ture Claimants, and the Problem of Third Party Non-Debtor "Dischaige",84 IOWA L. REV. 753
(1999) (explaining why third-party non-debtor discharges have not succeeded with creditors or courts and arguing that bankruptcy courts should lack jurisdiction to negate such
releases).
19 See Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); sources
cited infra note 24.
20
See sources cited infra notes 24-25.
21
See sources cited infra note 24.
22
See Lungs and Bronchus: U.S. Racial / Ethnic Cancer Patterns, at http://www.cancer.
gov/statistics/cancertype/lung-racial-ethnic (last visited Apr. 7, 2003) (finding that
"[c]igarette smoking accounts for nearly 90% of all lung cancers"); se generally U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., SMOKING AND

HEAuri: A

NATIONAL STATUS REPORT,

No. 87-8396 (1990), http://sgreports.nlm.nih.gov/nn/b/b/v/p/-/nnbvp.pdf.
23
See, e.g., Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203 (Cal. 1997).
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and asbestos exposure 24-i.e., that "the risk of harm from exposure to
both carcinogens is greater than the sum of the risk from exposure to
the individual carcinogens. '25 Applying this synergy concept, asbestos
defendants have attempted to seek apportionment in cases involving
26
smoker-plaintiffs.
In these synergy cases, asbestos defendants have pursued two
strategies based on causation and apportionment theories. First, the
defendants argue that asbestos exposure did not cause the claimant's
lung cancer. 27 Second, they opine alternatively that, even assuming
that asbestos was a causal factor, the asbestos defendants are entitled
to apportionment from tobacco companies of their liability as offset
by the percentage of fault that a fact-finder attributes to the plaintiffs
28
tobacco use.
For two reasons, asbestos defendants have been, for the most
part, unsuccessful with both of these strategies. First, despite the existence of research that validates the synergy between asbestos exposure
and smoking, courts have been reluctant to allow juries to apportion
liability because such apportionment would be too speculative. 29 Interestingly, one might assume that courts in states with comparative
negligence regimes would at least entertain the apportionment argument, as the "underlying philosophy [of comparative negligence is
that] each wrongdoer should pay for his or her own fault. '' 31 Yet, in
cases in which asbestos defendants have implicated tobacco as contributing to a plaintiff's injury, such courts have precluded
3
apportionment. '
The second barrier to the quest for apportionment is that some
states have immunized the tobacco industry from direct liability for
their products. For example, California has enacted such immunizing
24 See Council on Scientific Affairs, A Physician's Guide to Asbestos-Related Diseases, 252
JAMA 2593, 2593-96 (1984); PhilipJ. Landrigan, The Recognition and Control of Occupational
Disease, 266 JAMA 676 (1991).
25 Altiere v. Fibreboard Corp., 617 A.2d 1302, 1305 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (citing Arnold E. Reif, Synergism in Carcinogenesis,73J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 25 (1984)).
26 See, e.g., Taylor v. Celotex Corp., 574 A.2d 1084 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (affirming
trial court's denial of apportionment instruction in case in which plaintiff-smoker exposed
to asbestos suffered from asbestosis).
27 See Borman v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 960 F.2d 327, 331 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting defense expert's testimony that asbestos exposure did not cause plaintiffs lung cancer).
28 See id.
29 Martin v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 528 A.2d 947, 950 (Pa. 1987) (holding
that a "'[r]ough approximation' [in apportionment] is no substitute for justice" (citation
omitted)).
30

VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 1.2 (3d ed. 1994).

31

See cases cited supra notes 26-29. But see Brisboy v. Fibreboard Corp., 418 N.W.2d

650, 654-55 (Mich. 1988) (affirming a jury's apportionment of 55% fault to the plaintiff

for his own "negligence" from smoking).
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legislation; 3 2 thus, in cases in which asbestos defendants seek apportionment credit for a plaintiff's tobacco use under California's apportionment and comparative fault statute, 3-3 California courts refuse the
request because the nonparty tobacco defendant is not a "tortfeasor."
The courts reason that because legislation precludes liability against
tobacco manufacturers on direct claims, courts may not hold the tobacco industry even nominally liable under the apportionment
doctrine.3
2.

4

Separate Contribution Claims

Asbestos companies have also attempted to obtain contribution
from the tobacco industry in separate contribution actions. As noted
above, in comparative fault jurisdictions, ajury may take into account
the conduct of nonparties to a litigation when apportioning liability in
the original action or in a separate contribution action.3 All jurisdictions, including those adopting a form of the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA),346 impose time limits for contribution actions, usually one to two years following the underlying claim of
7
personal injury liability.
Statutes of limitations, however, are not the precluding factor
that prevents asbestos defendants from pursuing separate contribution actions. Simply put, asbestos defendants would not prevail on
such actions for many of the same reasons that they do not succeed
under the apportionment theory in the original actions. 8 First, in
jurisdictions that have immunized the tobacco industry fron direct
liability, a contribution claim fails as a matter of law. Second, some
comparative negligence states that do not follow the UCATA bar separate contribution actions against nonparties." ' Third, tobacco compa'32 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714.45 (West 1998) (affording immunity to suppliers of certain
unhealthy products, such as tobacco); see Stephen D. Sugarman, Tobacco Tort Litigation in
California: A Better Understandingof Civil Code Section 1714.45, 38 SAN DIE;o L. REV. 1051
(2001) .
3'4 CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 1431-1431.5 (West Supp. 2003).
"44 See Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1225 (Cal. 1997); Richards v.
Owens-Illinois, Inc., 928 P.2d 1181, 1183 (Cal. 1997).
35

AMERICAN LAw OF PRODucTs LIABILITn§ 52:27 (Timothy E. Travers et al. eds., 3d

ed. 1987) WrL ALPL § 52:27 ("a number of jurisdictions require the trier of fact to consider
the fault of all persons who contributed to the alleged injury.").
316
See id. § 57:31 (discussing the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act).
37 See id. § 52:87 (discussing limitations period in actions for contribution).
-38 See supra Part I.B.I.
39
See, e.g., St. Mary's Hosp. v. Health Personnel Options Corp., 72 N.E.2d 1213 (111.
App. Ct. 1999) (holding that a separate contribution action against a nonparty was precluded for failure to join in original action); Casa Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 951 S.W.2d
865 (Tex. App. 1997) (upholding summary judgment against a defendant seeking a postjudgment contribution claim against a party that the plaintiff did not name in the original
action); Howell v. Luckey, 518 S.E.2d 873 (W. Va. 1999) (holding that a defendant cannot
bring a separate contribution claim against a nonparty to the original action and rejecting
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nies are not liable under direct strict liability doctrine: no jurisdiction
has imposed categorical liability for tobacco products. 41 Thus, plaintiffs seeking action against the tobacco industry must resort to failure41
to-warn, misrepresentation, and conspiracy theories.
The difficulty an asbestos company would confront in bringing a
claim under any of these theories is clear. Even if (1) the asbestos
defendant brings the separate contribution claim within the statute of
limitations, (2) the venue of the action is in a jurisdiction in which
plaintiffs may bring contribution actions against nonparties, and (3)
the state has not immunized the tobacco industry, what would constitute the asbestos defendant's case? The case would require proof in
support of an unworkable theory-either failure-to-warn or misrepresentation to the original plaintiff-that tobacco companies induced
her to start and continue smoking. Such a claim would involve protracted litigation, not about the asbestos defendant's case, but rather
about the original plaintiff's case. This obstacle is probably why asbestos defendants have neither attempted conventional separate contri42
bution claims nor joined tobacco defendants in the original actions.
Apportionment in the original action and contribution in a separate action would appear to offer relief to asbestos defendants, because there is substantial evidence regarding the synergy between
tobacco use and asbestos exposure. 43 I These options, however, offer
few prospects for relief in light of tobacco's special status in tort and
the difficulties in proving causation. 44 Nonetheless, as discussed in
the following subpart, in the late 1990s another avenue for relief-in
addition to apportionment and contribution-arose for asbestos defendants to shift a portion of their liability to the tobacco industry:
RICO.
C.

RICO and the Funds Cases

Emboldened by the tobacco industries' multi-billion dollar settlements with the states, 45 plaintiffs' attorneys representing various
the UCATA approach). But see Steve Spicer Motors, Inc. v. Gilliam, 19 S.W.3d 153 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2000) (holding that the original plaintiff need not name the alleged tortfeasor in the
underlying action for that tortfeasor to be subject to contribution in a separate action).
40
SeeJames A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier:The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1317-18 (1991); see
also RESTATEIENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1998) § 2 cmt. d ("[C]ourts
have not imposed liability for categories of products that are generally available, widely
used and consumed, even if they pose substantial risks of harm.").
41
See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
42
See Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
43
See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
44
See supra notes 27, 40 and accompanying text.
45
The landmark tobacco litigation brought by approximately forty states was provisionally settled in June 1997. See FrankJ. Vandall, The Legal Theory and the Visionaries that
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health care insurance provider funds,4 1 occupational health trust
funds, 47 and hospitals 48 began bringing third-party contribution
claims against the tobacco industry. 49 The liability theory that the
Funds employed approximated the theory used by the states; namely,
they argue that the tobacco industry should pay a portion of the costs
the Funds incurred in treating tobacco-related illnesses. 5"
All of the Funds' actions invoked a mix of antitrust laws, RICO, or
state fraud causes of action as the bases for their claims. 5' The Funds'
allegations fell into two categories: (1) indirect injury claims-that
over a period of forty years the tobacco industry suppressed the dangers of tobacco use, thereby inducing the Funds' participants to
smoke, which in turn forced the Funds to pay for their treatment; and
(2) direct injury claims-that due to the tobacco industry's conspiracy
to suppress the dangers of cigarette smoking, the Funds did not establish counseling programs to help their participants quit smoking. 52
Almost all of the courts that addressed these claims disposed of them
53
as a matter of law against the Funds plaintiffs.

A valid civil RICO claim can be distilled as follows: the defendant
has (1) violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (setting forth the "[p]rohibited activLed to the Proposed $368.5 Billion Tobacco Settlement, 27 Sw. U. L. REv. 473, 478 (1998). The
innovative theory of liability rested on the idea that "the states should be able to sue in
order to recover the costs of treating disease .. caused by cigarette smoking." Id.
46
See Regence Blueshield v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 99-35203, 2001 WL 205996 (9th
Cir. Feb. 28, 2001); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 133 F.
Supp. 2d 162 (E.D.N.Y.2001); Ark. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Philip Morris, Inc., 47 F.
Supp. 2d 936 (N.D. Il. 1999).
47
Serv. Employees Int'l Union Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 249 F.3d
1068 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Lyons v. Philip Morris, Inc., 225 F.3d 909 (8th Cir. 2000); Tex.
Carpenters Health Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 199 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000); Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1999); Or.
Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 185 F.3d 957 (9th
Cir. 1999); Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d
912 (3d Cir. 1999); E. States Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 729 N.Y.S.2d 240
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000); Steamfitters Local Union No. 614 Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip
Morris, Inc., No. W1999-01061-COA-R9-CV, 2000 WL 1390171 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 26,
2000).
48
See Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429 (3d Cir. 2000).
49 This Note refers to these entities collectively as "Funds."
50
See Vandall, supra note 45.
51
See cases cited supra notes 46-47.
52
See Allegheny Gen., 228 F.3d at 433-34.
53
See Serv. Employees, 249 F.3d at 1068; Regence Blueshield v. Philip Morris, Inc., No.
99-35203, 2001 WL 205996 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2001); Lyons, 225 F.3d at 909; Laborers Local
17,191 F.3d at 229; Steamfitters Local Union No. 420, 171 F.3d at 912; Ark. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield v. Philip Morris, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 936 (N.D. Il. 1999); Steamfitters Local Union No.
614, 2000 WL 1390171; E. States, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 240. But see Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 162 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (rejecting a motion for
summary judgment); Serv. Employees Int'l Union Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 70 (D.D.C. 1999), rev'd, Serv. Employees, 249 F.3d at 1068 (same).
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ities" which trigger a civil RICO claim); 54 and (2) "by reason of' having violated § 1962, the defendant has caused the plaintiff to suffer an
injury to her "business or property."55 The Supreme Court in Holmes
v. Securities Investor Protection Corp. construed the "by reason of' lan56
guage in § 1964 as requiring either cause-in-fact or but-for cause.
The Holmes Court stated that, although not explicit in the language of
§ 1964, a civil RICO plaintiff must also establish proximate cause in
the common-law sense. 5 7 It is this proximate cause hurdle that has
hampered the Funds' RICO claims.
Courts that have passed on the Funds cases have uniformly relied
on insufficient proof of proximate cause as the basis for dismissing the
claims. 58 Invoking the proximate cause standard for RICO claimants,

as set forth in Holmes, lower courts have held that the damages sought
by the Funds as third parties against the tobacco industry are too remote and speculative. 59 Of the ten third-party contribution actions
brought against the tobacco industry by the Funds, only two survived
summary judgment at the trial level. 61 Consequently, it appeared that
the tobacco industry had laid to rest this type of third-party contribution claim. 6 1 Third-party contribution claims against the tobacco industry, however, were not all dead-at least not yet. On November 11,
1999, in Falisev. American Tobacco Co., the Johns-Manville Trust filed a
54 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(a)-(d) (2002). This section requires that the conduct, or
rather the predicate acts, constitute a "pattern of racketeering activity." Id. § 1962(a). A
"'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two" predicate acts. Id. § 1961 (5).
55 Id. § 1964(c). For a general discussion of RICO elements and commentary, see
ARTHUR F. MATHEWS ET AL., CIVIL RICO LITIGATION (2d ed. 1992); Roger T. Creager, A

Current Guide to Civil RICO in New York Federal Courts, 66 N.Y. ST. B.J. 18 (1994).
56 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
57 See id. at 268.
58
See, e.g., Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 443-46 (3d Cir.
2000).
59 A RICO plaintiffs claim fails "for being too remote and speculative" due to the
following proximate cause policy considerations: (1) the injury is too indirect-"the more
indirect the injury, 'the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of a plaintiffs
damages .. .'; (2) allowing recovery by indirectly injured parties would require complicated
rules for apportioning damages; and (3) direct victims could generally be counted on to
vindicate the policies underlying the relevant law." Steamfitters Local Welfare Fund v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 932 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269-70).
This Note further explicates the Holmes articulation of proximate cause under RICO
in Part III. For a general discussion of RICO proximate cause, see Antonella M. Madonia,
Comment, Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.: Standing to Sue Under Section
1964(c) of RICOfor the Securities FraudPlaintiff 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 923 (1993) and Stephen
Scallan, Proximate Cause Under RICO, 20 S.ILL. U. L.J. 455 (1996).
60
The two actions that survived summaryjudgnent are Blue Cross & Blue Shield of New
Jersey, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 162 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) and Service Employees
InternationalUnion Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 70 (D.D.C.
1999), revd, 249 F.3d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
61
For a discussion criticizing the courts' use of proximate cause to nullify third-party
claims under RICO by fund-type entities, see Stasia Mosesso, Note, Up in Smoke: How the
Proximate Cause Battle Extinguished the Tobacco War, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 257 (2000).
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third-party contribution claim under RICO against the American To62
bacco Company and other cigarette manufacturers.
II
CASE DIscussiON: FALISE v. AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY

A.

The Falise Plaintiffs' Theories of Recovery

The plaintiffs in Falise were the trustees of the Johns-Manville
Trust (the "Trust"), a trust which was created in 1988 to cover the
outstanding asbestos liability of the bankrupt Johns-Manville Corporation. 63 The Trust brought a mixed civil RICO and state fraud action
against various tobacco defendants ("Tobacco"), seeking monetary
damages for their alleged contribution to the asbestos-related injuries
suffered by the Trust's claimants. 64 In essence, the action claimed
that the liabilities of the Trust were "substantially due to Tobacco's
alleged misconduct in suppressing and concealing material information, and disseminating misinformation" concerning the risks posed
65
to those who both smoked and were exposed to asbestos.

Judge Weinstein catalogued the plaintiffs' theories of recovery as
follows: (1) a RICO settlement action claim alleging that Tobacco engaged in conduct directed at the Trust that fraudulently misinformed
the Trust of the synergistic effects between smoking and asbestos exposure in order to minimize the damages that Tobacco would owe to
smoker-asbestos claimants ("'RICO Settlement Action"); (2) a RICO
litigation action claim alleging that Tobacco devised a scheme to
fraudulently misinform the Trust, causing the Trust to forego the option to implead Tobacco as a co-defendant in asbestos-related litigations ("'RICO Litigation Action"'); (3) a RICO direct payment action
claim alleging that Tobacco engaged in conduct to fraudulently misinform asbestos workers to encourage them to continue to smoke and
not to quit, thereby increasing the number of claimants to whom the
Trust was liable (" 'RICO Direct Payment Action"'); (4) a RICO investment action alleging that Tobacco invested RICO-derived income to
fund a scheme to cause the Trust to bear greater payments than it
otherwise would have ("'RICO Investment Action"'); and (5) a state
fraud action alleging that Tobacco's fraudulent scheme caused more
serious asbestos-related injuries due to the synergy between smoking
and asbestos exposure, in violation of state common law ("'State
Fraud Action' ").66
62
63

64
65
66

See Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 322 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
Id.
See id.
Id. at 326.
See id. at 322-23.
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Relevant Evidence of Fraudulent Misinformation and Synergy

The Falise opinion referenced a wide array of state-of-the-art medical literature illustrating the synergy between smoking and asbestosrelated injury, as well as Tobacco's very own documentation showing
the fraudulent concealment of such synergistic effects. 6 7 The Trust's
medical evidence included articles and studies dating as far back as
the early 1970s, detailing the increased health risks caused by the
combination of tobacco use and asbestos exposure. 6 8 In addition, the
Trust cited more recent studies, including a 1996 study which found
the incidence of lung cancer to be fifty-three times greater for an asbestos-exposed smoker than for an unexposed non-smoker, and ten
times greater than for a non-smoker occupationally exposed to
asbestos.

69

The complaint also referenced seemingly damning documentary
evidence of Tobacco's campaign of fraudulent misinformation concerning the synergistic effects between smoking and asbestos exposure. 7° Specifically, it noted internal memoranda demonstrating
Tobacco's knowledge of the synergistic effects, 71 as well as Tobacco's
72
alleged cover-up of such knowledge.
Examples of evidence relating to Tobacco's knowledge of the synergy included a document that an attorney for American Tobacco
drafted in 1978 acknowledging that "'the risk [of lung cancer in] a
smoking asbestos worker is enormously inflated over that of a nonsmoking asbestos worker,'" 7" and a 1968 Philip Morris memorandum
suggesting that "asbestos workers... should be discouraged from indulging in the habit [of smoking] .74 Moreover, the complaint referenced publications illustrating Tobacco's cover-up of its knowledge
and dissemination of misinformation. 75 For example, a 1979 article
published by the Tobacco Institute claimed that asbestos workers who
do not smoke faced an increased risk of cancer, 76 and a 1997 R.J.
67

68

See id. at 327-33.
See id. at 327 (citing G. Berry et al., Combined Effects of Asbestos Exposure and Smoking

on Mortality from Lung Cancer in Factory Workers, 2 LANCET 476, 478 (1972) (finding that the
risk fiom combined tobacco use and asbestos exposure was fifty times greater than that in
unexposed populations)).
69
See id. (citing Piero Mustacchi, Lung Cancer Latency and Asbestos Liability, 17J. LEGAL
MED. 277, 280-97 (1996) (study of 17,800 insulators and asbestos workers over a twentyyear period)).
70
See id. at 328.
71
See id. (referencing Plaintiff's Amended Complaint at 46-47, 49).
72
See id. at 328-29 (referencing Plaintiffs Amended Complaint at 48, 50, 52).
73
Id. at 328 (reproducing Plaintiffs Amended Complaint at 46 (quoting Memorandum fi-om Janet Brown, American Tobacco (Nov. 22, 1978))).
74
See id. (reproducing PlaintiWs Amended Complaint at
46 (quoting Memorandum fiom H. Wakeham, Philip Morris (Aug. 7, 1968))).
75
See id. at 328-29.
76
See id.
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Reynolds article claimed that one could interpret the data concerning
the synergy between smoking and asbestos as smoking protecting the
smoker from occupational exposure to asbestos.7 7 The court's extensive explication of this documentation in its opinion emphasizes its
importance to the ruling on Tobacco's motions for summary judgment as to all of the Trust's claims.
C.

Falise Analysis and Adjudication of the Plaintiffs' Claims on
Tobacco's Motion for Summary Judgment

The opening salvo in the Falise litigation was Tobacco's motion
for summary judgment as to all of the Trust's claims. Judge Weinstein
granted Tobacco's motions as to the Trust's RICO Settlement Action
and RICO Litigation Action, but the court permitted the Trust's RICO
78
Direct Payment Action 'toproceed to trial.
1. Dismissal of RICO Settlement Action and RICO Litigation Action
Claims
Under its RICO Settlement Action and RICO Litigation Action
theories, brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)'s mail and wire
fraud prohibitions, the Trust alleged that it had relied to its detriment
on Tobacco's misinformation.79 In particular, the Trust pleaded that,
in reliance on the misrepresentation directed at it by Tobacco, the
Trust (1) forewent the opportunity to implead the tobacco defendants
in the original asbestos suits; (2) assumed Tobacco's share of the injuries that the Trust's claimants suffered; and (3) settled claims that it
would not otherwise have settled."
Because the Trust's action alleged mail and wire fraud as the
predicate acts for RICO liability, the Trust was required to show justified reliance on Tobacco's fraud: 8 1 "[J]ustified reliance on the [alleged] fraud is necessary to establish causation in fact."'8 2 In cases in
which, as here, the allegedly fraudulent scheme is directed at a large
segment of the population, the requirement is met if the reliance is
both detrimental and reasonable.8 3 Unfortunately for the Trust, its
depositions and responses to interrogatories supported the conclu77
78

See id.at 329 (referencing Plaintiff's Counterstatement on Direct Injury at 12).
Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 91 F. Supp. 2d 525, 527 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); see supra text

accompanying notes 61-62. The court also initially denied summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff's RICO Investment Action and State Fraud Action. See Falise, 94 F.
Supp. 2d at 323. However, it subsequently granted the motion for the RICO Investment
Action. See id.
79 See Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 322.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 334.
82

[(.

8-"

/d. at 334, 337.
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sion that the reason the Trust did not implead Tobacco in the original
personal injury actions was, in fact, that the Trust did not believe it
could ultimately prevail against Tobacco at trial.8 4 The Trust also conceded that it had knowledge of the synergistic effects of asbestos exposure and tobacco use as early as 1988.85 Such evidence, according to

86
the court, indicated that Tobacco did not mislead the Trust at all.
Therefore, the Trust could not have detrimentally relied on Tobacco's misinformation and misrepresentation.8 7 Due to the Trust's
lack of detrimental reliance on Tobacco's misrepresentations, the
court dismissed both the RICO Settlement and RICO Litigation
claims. 88

2.

The RICO Direct Payment Action Survives Summary Judgment
and Proceeds to Trial

With respect to the RICO Direct Payment Action,89 the court
held that there was a "sufficient showing of detrimental reliance" to
satisfy RICO's but-for cause requirement.9 0 More importantly, unlike
other Funds cases, which failed to surmount the proximate cause obstacle due to the indirect nature of the harm, 9 1 the Trust in Falise succeeded in satisfying the proximate cause requirement as well. 92 Judge

Weinstein held that, although the Trust based its claim upon an indi93
rect injury, the Trust satisfied proximate cause.
In order to reach this decision, the Falise court distinguished the
case at bar from the Second Circuit case most directly on point, Laborers Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc.,°4 and applied
Holmes's9 5 tripartite proximate cause policy factors. 96 Holmes explicated the following three policy considerations for courts to weigh in
determining whether proximate cause limits an indirect, harm-based
Id. at 336.
See id. Indeed, the Trust admitted that "perhaps" by 1988 it had been aware of a
1985 Surgeon General report "indicat[ing] that the risk of lung cancer among asbestos
workers was five times higher than that for workers in other industries, [and] that said risk
is 50 times higher if the asbestos worker smokes." Id.
86
See id. at 337.
84
85

87
88

See id.

Id.
See supra text accompanying note 66.
90
Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 337.
91 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
92
See Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 347. "'"The general tendency of the law, in regard to
damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step.""' Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp.,
503 U.S. 258, 271-72 (1992) (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State
Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 534 (1983) (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer
Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 533 (1918))).
93
Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 347.
94
191 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1999).
95
503 U.S. 258 (1992).
96
See Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 340-47; infra Part III.A.3.
89
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RICO claim: (1) the difficulty in assessing damages if a jury attributes
a plaintiffs harm to independent factors; (2) the difficulty of apportioning damages among different plaintiffs in order to "obviate the
risk of multiple recoveries"; and (3) the possibility of more directly
injured victims who could be "counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys general."9 7 Applying these criteria to Falise's facts,
Judge Weinstein held that intervening causes were minimal,98 that
there was no threat of difficulty in apportioning damages,"' and that
there were no other more direct victims who could more appropriately bring a civil RICO action. 10 Consequently, Judge Weinstein permitted the Trust to continue its RICO Direct Payment Action. 10
The Falise court's finding of sufficient proximate cause presents
the most controversial aspect of the decision. 1 2 Part III parses in further detail the proximate cause analysis in Falise in relation to Holmes
and Laborers Local 17.
D.

Resolution of the Case

In January 2001, the Falise saga came to an abrupt, albeit bizarre,
end when the judge declared a mistrial."113 Subsequently, asbestos
manufacturers either withdrew similar cases brought in other jurisdic10 4
tions, or judges dismissed those complaints.
III
ANAIYSIS

This Part argues that the Falise court's causation finding with regard to the RICO Direct Payment claim is consistent with a broad
reading of the Supreme Court's Holmes causation test, even if the decision seems on its face to be inconsistent with existing Second Circuit
doctrine. It argues also that the court's decision to allow the contribution claim to proceed was correct for three reasons. First, one can
distinguish the Falise plaintiffs and facts from other fund-type contribution actions. Second, countervailing policy considerations, such as
the fact that current contribution and apportionment systems and
97
98

See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269-70.
See Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 342-44.

See id. at 344-45.
See id. at 345-46.
See id. at 347. The court also allowed the Trust to proceed on its State Fraud Action. See id. at 357.
102 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
103 Tom Hays, Tobacco-Asbestos Mistrial Declared, AP, Jan. 25, 2001 (noting that a juror
sent Judge Weinstein a hand-written note on the fifth day of deliberations reading "Juror
99
100
101

has made threat against otherjuror to kill if required to be here 'much longer"' and also

that the jury was deadlocked for the tobacco industry and that tensions were mounting
against the holdouts).
104 See Asbestos Products, supra note 5.
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mechanisms provide few remedies for mass toxic tort defendants, tip
the balance of proximate cause in favor of letting the claim proceed.
Third, given the unique and intertwined nature of the tobacco and
asbestos litigations, courts should establish contribution and apportionment mechanisms for illnesses that juries can attribute to both
tobacco and asbestos. Allowing contribution through a RICO action
provides an innovative opportunity for courts to establish such
mechanisms.
A.

The Falise Court Properly Found Sufficient But-For and
Proximate Causation

The Falisecourt's conclusion that the plaintiffs' RICO Direct Payment claim satisfies proximate cause appears to contradict both generally prevailing law, 105 as well as the law of the Second Circuit.10 6 Not
surprisingly, some have accused Judge Weinstein of performing analytical acrobatics in order to sidestep the Second Circuit's holding in
Laborers Local 17 to arrive at a finding of sufficient proof of causation. 10 7 Regardless, the Falisecourt's analysis is sound. The following
subparts argue that the Second Circuit's re-articulation of Holmes
overly ossifies the Holmes conceptualization of proximate cause. Although Falise may appear contrary to Laborers Local 17, the decision
squares with the Supreme Court's articulation of RICO causation in
Holmes.
It bears noting that the Falisecourt found sufficient proof of the
first prong of the causation analysis-but-for causation. To do so, the
court referred to the Harris Model, a statistical model prepared by the
Trust's expert that compared the quit rates of asbestos worker smokers who had information concerning the synergistic effects of smoking
and asbestos exposure to those workers who lacked such information.1 08 The court held that the study provided a sufficient basis, for
summaryjudgment purposes, to find that the asbestos worker smokers
detrimentally relied on Tobacco's misrepresentations and omissions
so as to establish but-for causation.' 0 9 As the core civil RICO cases
involving third-party contribution are disposed under the second
105
See Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 443-45 (3d Cir.
2000); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734 Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 196 F.3d 818, 823-26 (7th Cir. 1999).
106
See Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229

(2d Cir. 1999).
107
See E. States Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 729 N.Y.S. 2d 240,
248-49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).
108
See Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 337-38 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
109
See id. at 338.
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prong, proximate cause,I1 0 the subsequent analysis of Falise focuses
only on the proximate cause issue under RICO.
1.

Causation in Civil RICO Under Holmes

The Supreme Court spoke for the first time on the issue of causation under civil RICO in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.' '
First, Holmes validated the requirement of but-for causation under 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c), stating that one could read the language in the statute "to mean that a plaintiff is injured 'by reason of' a RICO violation.., on showing that.., the defendant's violation was a 'but for'
cause of plaintiffs injury." 1 2 Second, in addition to but-for cause,
Holmes further imposed a proximate cause requirement. Although
§ 1964(c) does not explicitly articulate such a requirement, 1 3 the
Court, by analogizing civil RICO to antitrust statutes and the Clayton
114
Act, held that § 1964(c) also requires proof of proximate cause.
Initially, the Holmes Court articulated the proximate cause requirement as one grounded in common-law traditions. The Court
opined that "we use 'proximate cause' to label generically the judicial
tools used to limit a person's responsibility for the consequences of
that person's own acts. At bottom, the notion of proximate cause reflects 'ideas of what justice demands, or of what is administratively possible and convenient. "115 Then, the Court focused its articulation of
proximate cause in terms of directness, to wit: "[A]mong the many
shapes [that proximate cause] took at common law was a demand for
some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious
conduct alleged." 1" 6 Finally, the Court presented the three policy
considerations already analyzed in connection with the "directness" of
1 7
the relationship between the injury and the violation. '
110

See supra note 5 and accompanying text.

111

503 U.S. 258 (1992). For a summary of the facts of Holmes, see Madonia, supra note

59, at 938-41.
112

Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 265-66 (1992)

(citation

omitted).
11'5 Edward Brodsky, RICO and 'IndirectInjuries', N.Y. L.J, Mar. 8, 1995, at 3, 3 ("Justice
Souter, writing for the majority, imported the proximate cause requirement of § 4 of the
Clayton Act into RICO's § 1964-even though the statute contains no such stated
criteria.").
114
See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268. Analogizing § 1964(c) to the Clayton Act, Justice Souter, writing for the majority, explained: "Thus, we held that a plaintiff's right to sue ...
required a showing that the defendant's violation not only was a 'but for' cause of his
injury, but was the proximate cause as well. The reasoning applies just as readily to
§ 1964(c)." Id.
115 Id. at 268 (quoting PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAw OF TORTS § 41 (W. Page Keeton et
al. eds., 5th ed. 1984)).
116
Id. (citation omitted).
117
See supra Part II.C.2.
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Two observations are relevant here. First, the Court prefaced the
policy considerations relating to "directness" with the statement that
although it is a central element, "such directness of relationship is not
the sole requirement of... causation." 1 8 Second, as noted above, the
Court began its proximate cause discussion by referencing the common-law traditions and roots of proximate cause. 119 Bearing in mind
these observations, one can express the Holmes causation analysis for
civil RICO as a two-prong inquiry of but-for cause and proximate
cause. The latter prong of proximate cause considers traditional notions of fairness as well as the above three policy considerations concerning "directness."
2.

Proximate Cause in Civil RICO Under Laborers Local 17: A
Narrow Reading of Directness

Seven years after Holmes, the Second Circuit addressed the issue
of proximate cause in the RICO third-party contribution case Laborers
Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc. 120 The plaintiffs
in Laborers Local 17 alleged that Tobacco conspired to deceive union
health funds as to the dangers of smoking in order to shift the health121
related costs of smoking to the plaintiffs.
The LaborersLocal 17 court first distinguished between direct injuries and indirect injuries by discussing the direct injury test-"whether
the damages a plaintiff sustains are derivative of an injury to a third
party."' 22 If there is such a derivative injury, "then the injury is indirect; if not, it is direct."'123 The court, citing Holmes, justified its focus
on the import of "directness." 124 Specifically, the Laborers Local 17
court commenced its analysis by stating that "Holmes emphasized that
although the direct injury test 'is not the sole requirement of [proximate] causation, it has been one of its central elements'"; therefore,
"plead [ing] a direct injury is a key element for establishing proximate
causation .. . ."125 The court further illustrated its focus on the concept of "directness" of injury by referring to the settled tort law concept that plaintiffs who are obligated to pay the medical expenses of
another may not recover against the tortfeasor who caused the dam118

Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269.

119
120

Id. at 268.
191 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1999).

121

See id. at 232-33.

122

Id. at 238-39.

123

Id. at 239.

124

Id. at 235.

125 Id. (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269 (1992) and
citing Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 540 (1983)).
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age, because "their injuries are ... derive[d] wholly from the injuries
12 6
sustained by [a] third party," and thus are indirect.
The Second Circuit's logic implicitly narrows Holmes by underscoring "directness" as a dispositive measure. Pursuant to the Laborers
Local 17 approach, once a court determines the injury to be "derivative" or "indirect," there is no proximate cause.1 2 7 In applying the
direct injury test, the court concluded that the Plaintiffs' injuries
are entirely derivative of the harm suffered by plan participants as a
result of using tobacco products ....
Being purely contingent on
harm to third parties, these injuries are indirect. Consequently, because defendants' alleged misconduct did not proximately cause
the injuries alleged, plaintiffs lack standing to bring RICO claims
against defendants. 128
After concluding that a "derivative" or "indirect" injury forecloses
proximate cause, the court then determined whether this was consistent with Holmes's tripartite policy considerations.1 29 Not surprisingly,
the LaborersLocal 17 court's application of the Holmes policy considerations corresponded with its finding of no proximate cause. 130 The
Holmes considerations, as parsed by the Second Circuit, essentially
served as an after-the-fact formality. It bears noting, however, that the
Second Circuit did qualify its narrow application of directness by
stating:
[W]e follow the lead of the Holmes Court in making clear that, to
the extent our description of "indirect" or "derivative" injury might
seem to encompass cases where recovery by the plaintiff would not
run afoul of the policy concerns set forth [by the Holmes court], the
outer limits of the direct injury test are described more by those
13 1
concerns than by any bright-line, verbal definition.
Although this language is consistent with the Holmes court's flexible
articulation of proximate cause, the Second Circuit ostensibly applied
"directness" as a bright-line rule.1 32 That is, under Laborers Local 17,
determining that the harm pleaded is indirect or derivative appears to
be fatal in fact.

126
127
128
129

130
131
132

Id. at 237.
See id. at 239.
Id.

See id.
See id. at 239-41.
Id. at 239 n.4.
See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
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The Falise Court's Proximate Cause Analysis: Applying Holmes
and Laborers Local 17

In contrast to Laborers Local 17, but in accordance with a flexible
reading of Holmes, the Falise court did not treat "directness" as dispositive. It conceded the indirect or derivative nature of the harm alleged-that Tobacco's misrepresentations led asbestos-exposed
smokers to continue smoking, thereby increasing the Trust's liability.13 3 However, by focusing his analysis on the Holmes policy considerations, Judge Weinstein concluded that the considerations favored a
finding of proximate cause. In other words, the Falise court concluded that this particular case was just one of those cases that the
Laborers Local 17 court had alluded to, in which there is an indirect
harm that does "not run afoul of the policy concerns" set forth by
34
Holmes.1
a.

Holmes Policy Concern No. 1: Difficulty of Assessing Damages
Due to Intervening Causal Factors

With respect to the first Holmes policy concern-the difficulty of
assessing damages in cases in which there are independent causal factors-Judge Weinstein distinguished Falise based on several factors
that diminished the speculativeness of assessing damages, notwithstanding intervening causal elements.13 5 The Laborers Local 17 court
cited three possible intervening causes-that is, other reasons why the
third-party plaintiffs incurred harm-as further evidence of the diffi36
culty of assessing damages: 1
(1) the effect any smoking cessation programs or incentives would
have had on the number of smokers among the plan beneficiaries;
(2) the countereffect that . . . [Tobacco's] . . . direct fraud would
have had on the smokers ... ; and (3) other reasons why individual
smokers would continue smoking, even after having been informed
of the dangers ....

137

Addressing the intervening factor of individual smoker agency,
Judge Weinstein distinguished Faliseon the evidence pled. The court
133
See Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 334 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) ("[A] plaintiff may allege that 'his injuries were indirectly but proximately caused by a fraudulent
scheme directed at third parties ....
' (citation omitted)).
134 Id. at 341 (emphasis in original) (quoting Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit
Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 239 n.4 (2d Cir. 1999)).
135 See id. at 342-43.
136 The Laborers Local 17 court referenced the first Holmes policy consideration, which
concerned the difficulty of determining damages due to potential intervening causes:
"'First, the less direct an injury.., the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of
a plaintiff's damages attributable to the violation, as distinct from other, independent, factors."' Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 239 (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Investor Corp., 503 U.S.
258, 269 (1992)).
137 Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 343 (quoting Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 239-40).
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posited that elements absent from the other Funds cases diminished
the speculativeness of the damage assessment caused by the intervening agency of individual smokers who decide whether and how frequently to smoke.'3 8 In this regard, Judge Weinstein referred to the
statistical evidence of increased risks of harm to asbestos-workers who
smoke:
Asbestos-workers faced a relative risk of developing lung cancer
which was some 500% greater than that faced by the smokers in the
general population who were not occupationally exposed to asbestos. Presented with these figures, it is difficult... to find that the
"other reasons" suggested in Laborers Local 17 would, in any mean1 39
ingful sense, lead asbestos-workers to continue smoking.
Hence, had this information concerning the heightened risk of harm
attendant to smokers occupationally exposed to asbestos been available, it would be reasonable to assume such persons would have ceased
to smoke.
More importantly, the Falise court pointed to another statistical
study the Trust presented in this case-the Harris Model. 14° This
study, which an expert for the Trust prepared, proffers a comparative
analysis of quit rates for asbestos-workers who "unlike the Trust's
claimants, were informed ... of the smoking-asbestos synergy and its

effects on human health."1 4 1 Accordingly, the court concluded that
such a study would afford "the jury ...a real world guide to measure
"
the effect of Tobacco's alleged misrepresentations and omissions. 142
The Falise court cited the Harris Model as diminishing both the speculativeness of the first LaborersLocal 17 intervening factor (assessing the'
effect on the Trust's claimants had the Trust and its claimants been
privy to the synergistic effects) as well as the third factor of intervening
43
smoker agency. 1
Arguably, it is improbable that asbestos workers would have quit
smoking had this data been made available to them; however, it is
nonetheless plausible that some may have sought different employment. Recall that the Holmes analysis requires a court only to determine the level of difficulty in assessing damages. 144 Indeed, under the
Holmes policy consideration analysis, a court assesses the difficulty of
apportioning damages in cases in which (1) the harm may be attributable to independent factors, and (2) there is a risk of multiple recov-

139

See id. at 342-44.
Id. at 344 (emphasis omitted).

140

See id. at 343-44.

141

Id.at 344.
Id.

138

142

143
144

Id. at 343-44.
See supra Part II.C.2.
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eries. 145 As the Falise court stated, this difficulty is tempered by the
availability of a benchmark-the statistical model itself, and the comparative statistical evidence of quit rates. 146 Furthermore, recall the
procedural posture of the case: it was on summary judgment. 14 7 In
light of the procedural posture, the court rightly credited the statistical model in favor of the Trust. Not only did the Harris Model present a touchstone for the jury to assess the damages (thereby
diminishing the speculative nature of such damages), it also created a

question of fact as to the validity of the study. This is not a question a
judge should determine on a motion for summary judgment; rather, it
148
should be decided by a jury.
As the Falise court correctly noted, the second intervening cause
the Laborers Local 17 court cited-the countereffect of Tobacco's
fraud despite the best efforts of the Funds-was irrelevant in that the
Trust in Falise did not claim that, but for Tobacco's misrepresentations, it would have created cessation programs. 149 As an admitted

joint tortfeasor, the Trust merely alleged that Tobacco's direct fraud
increased the number of claimants seeking tort recovery from the
Trust. Therefore, the direct fraud countereffect concern did not

apply.
At bottom, the salient intervening factor that troubled the Second Circuit in Laborers Local 17 was the individual agency of the smokers. As this subsection has argued, the Harris Model sufficiently

tempered the speculative nature of assessing damages due to this in50
tervening causal element.

See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269 (1992).
See Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 343-44.
147
See supra Part II.C.
148
Under the summary judgment standard, the movant prevails by showing that
"'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.'" Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246,
251 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Moreover, "[i]n applying this standard ... [a court] 'resolve[s] all ambiguities, and credit[s] all factual inferences that could
rationally be drawn, in favor of the party opposing summary judgment."' Id. (emphasis added)
(quoting Cifra v. Gen. Elec. Co., 252 F.3d 205, 216 (2d Cir. 2001)); see also Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) ('The evidence of the non-movant is to be
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.").
Of course, the tobacco defendants may have attacked the methodology and reliability
of the Harris Model under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, triggering a Daubert
question for the court. See Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 265-68
(2d Cir. 2002) (outlining the nature of a court's Daubert inquiry in determining the reliability of expert witness testimony and evidence). However, given that the case proceeded
with the Trust's statistical evidence intact, it would appear that the Harris Model and testimony survived any such Daubert scrutiny.
149
Falise,94 F. Supp. 2d at 343.
150
See supra notes 140-48 and accompanying text.
145
146
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Holmes Policy Concern No. 2: The Difficulty of Apportioning
Damages Among Different Plaintiffs to Prevent Double
Recovery

Addressing the second Holmes policy consideration-the problem
of double recovery-the Falise court found that the identity of the parties significantly diminished this concern. As the Falisecourt correctly
reasoned, the identity of the parties distinguished Falise from the
Fund cases because Tobacco and the asbestos companies ("Asbestos")
were joint tortfeasors, as the Trust "[stood] in this litigation as an 'admitted tortfeasor.'" 1 5

This is an important fundamental characteris-

tic distinguishing Falise from other health and fund third-party
contribution RICO actions. Recall that the plaintiffs in the other
RICO third-party contribution suits against Tobacco were insurance
and health-fund entities who were never subject to tort liability arising
from the third-party claimants' injuries.' 52 Thus, there was no danger
of double recovery in those cases.
Consider a hypothetical asbestos worker who smokes and develops lung cancer. If this worker were to bring a suit against the Trust
to recover for her injury, then courts would preclude her from subsequently bringing suit for the same harm against Tobacco. It follows
that the defendant in this case, Tobacco, is not in danger of being
subjected to double recovery. As the Falise court rightly noted: "A victim of a tort caused by multiple tortfeasors does not obtain overlapping recoveries."' 53 On the other hand, the danger of double
recovery was present in the Funds cases. The Funds' payment of medical expenses to our hypothetical plaintiff would not preclude her
claim against Tobacco, thereby subjecting Tobacco to double recovery. Given the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant in this case, the Falise court properly disposed of the second Holmes policy consideration in favor of proximate cause.
c.

Holmes Policy Concern No. 3: Existence of More Direct Victims
to Remedy the Violation

The Falisecourt's application of the third Holmes policy consideration-the existence of more "directly injured victims" who could be
relied upon to "vindicate the law as private attorneys general"15 4-is
the most tenuous part of the opinion. The Holmes court implied that
151

152

Id. at 344.

See, e.g.,
Serv. Employees Int'l Union Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
249 F.3d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 191 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1999); Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1999).
153 Falve, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 344.
154 Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269-70 (1992).
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"since directly injured victims can generally be counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys general, without any of the problems
attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured more remotely,"'

55

courts

disfavor indirect plaintiffs. In Falise, the directly harmed parties were
the asbestos-smoker plaintiffs who claimed that Tobacco's misrepresentations caused their injuries.1 5 6 It is clear that these plaintiffs
would be able to recover damages for their harms by bringing a direct
tort action against Tobacco. 57 Moreover, such recovery was possible
without the attendant difficulties intimated by the first and second
Holmes considerations. Facially, it would appear that this final Holmes
consideration cuts against a finding of proximate cause.
To address this issue, the Falisecourt first argued that because the
other policy considerations weighed in favor of a finding of proximate
cause, the court should discount the fact that more direct plaintiffs
existed. 158 Secondly, the court emphasized the outcome-efficiency of
allowing the Trust to litigate the matter: because eighty to ninety percent of the Trust's claimants were smokers, recovery would immedi159
ately vindicate the directly injured parties.
In Holmes, the Supreme Court did not articulate a per se standard
on how lower courts should assess the tripartite policy considerations.
In light of the Holmes Court's silence on the matter, it was reasonable
for the Falise court to discount one consideration because the other
two suggest a finding of proximate cause. Furthermore, this balancing approach conforms to the flexible notions associated with proximate cause. 16 0 Recall that the Holmes Court grounded its analysis
upon a framework of common-law proximate cause, a concept whose

155

Id.

156 See Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 343-45. The court noted that the third Holmes factor "turns in substantial part upon whether Trust Claimants who smoked would be better
suited to remedy existing injuries caused by Tobacco's conduct." Id. at 345.
157 See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
158 See Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 345.
159 See id. at 345-46.
160 The two modern conceptualizations of proximate cause, the Harper and James
unreasonable foreseeable risk of harm articulation and the competing theory of Prosser
and Keeton (which couches proximate cause as a question of legal policy) inherently recognize the flexibility of the doctrine. See PatrickJ. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law:
History, Theory, and the Present Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49, 52 (1991) ("Harper andJames
recognize that 'foreseeability' is an elastic concept.... Prosser and Keeton ... understand
proximate cause as 'the term ... applied by courts to those more or less undefined considerations which limit liability even where the fact of causation is clearly established."' (citations
omitted) (emphasis added)). Ultimately, Kelley notes that although "[m]odern tort theorists have lavished seemingly boundless attention on the problem of explaining proximate
cause ... the consensus of law students and others is that [it] remains a hopeless riddle."
1d. at 49-50; see also Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (noting
that "proximate cause ... depend[s] in each case upon many considerations").
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limits are defined by "'what justice demands. '"' 6 1 Thus, no single
consideration should be dispositive in proximate cause analysis. 162
Another line of reasoning that supports the Falisecourt's determination-that it should discount the existence of more direct partiesflows from the nature of this type of civil RICO action. It is clear that
the "more directly injured" parties in Falise, the smoker-plaintiffs exposed to asbestos, did not have any legal right to bring individual
claims under RICO "because under the statute, personal injuries are
not recoverable." 63 Therefore, the argument that Asbestos lacked
standing or was too remote a party to vindicate the RICO claim
against Tobacco falls apart; even the more direct parties (the directly
injured smokers and Trust claimants) are precluded from bringing
1
such a claim.

64

Indeed, it is only logical that whenever a plaintiff pleads an indirect harm, there will be a more direct plaintiff. The inquiry should
not end, as it does under Laborers Local 17, upon a showing that more
directly injured parties exist; a third-party contribution action, by definition, presumes that more directly harmed persons exist. Rather, the
third policy consideration in Holmes compels courts to inquire into
whether the directly injured plaintiff is better suited to litigate the
claim. As the Falise court explicated, and as argued above, the Trust
was not only the more appropriate plaintiff, but also the only plaintiff
to vindicate the harm. Moreover, even though the directly injured
plaintiffs could theoretically bring individual actions against Tobacco,
in practice they do not.165 Strategically, a smoker exposed to asbestos
is more likely to seek reparations solely from Asbestos, 166 thereby forever absolving Tobacco of liability.
Lastly, the fact that the adjudication of the civil RICO claim
would also address the injuries of future claimants further buttresses
the rationale that the Trust is the better situated plaintiff. That is, the
damages that the Trust obtains from Tobacco would also be available
to plaintiffs whose harms have yet to materialize. Although the Trust's
current claimants may have common-law tort claims against Tobacco,
the future claimants do not.
4.

Falise Proximate Cause Analysis Summary

As this Part has shown thus far, the Faliseproximate cause analysis
fits soundly within the Holmes framework. There was both sufficient
161
162
163

164

165
166

Holmes v. Sec. Investor
See Palsgraf 162 N.E. at
Mosesso, supra note 61,
Id.
See discussion infra Part
See discussion infra Part

Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) (citation omitted).
103.
at 338 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
III.B.1.
III.B.1.
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but-for and proximate causation. On its facts, Falise presented elements which overcame the three Holmes policy considerations. Yet, in
light of the dispositions of other circuit and district courts that have
addressed third-party contribution claims under civil RICO, and in
particular the Second Circuit's narrow application of the direct injury
test, it would be naive to propose that the Trust's Direct Payment Action could have survived an appeal. As expressed above, the vast majority of third-party claims involving hospitals, insurers, and health
funds seeking contribution from Tobacco illustrates that a majority of
courts are reluctant to hold that such plaintiffs have sufficient standing under the Holmes standard. 167 Had Tobacco appealed the Falise
court's recognition of standing, it is probable that the appellate court
would have overturned it as a misapplication of the Laborers Local 17
and Holmes RICO proximate cause analyses.
That said, the inquiry does not end here. The following subpart
argues that for policy reasons, the outcome of Falise-namely, the fact
that the court allowed the claim.,to proceed-was correct. This is so
because (1) Falise differs fundamentally from other RICO third-party
contribution actions; (2) policy considerations, such as the failure of
existing contribution mechanisms, favor a finding of proximate cause;
(3) the special relationship and problems that both the tobacco and
asbestos mass tort litigations pose warrant the creation of some system
of contribution between the two for harms attributable to both toxins;
and (4) the use of a RICO action in this regard would be an innovative alternative contribution vehicle.
B.

Public Policy and Equity Considerations Militate in Favor of
Allowing the Contribution Claim to Proceed

The fundamental element that distinguishes Falise from other
health and fund third-party contribution RICO actions is the identity
of the third-party plaintiffs. In Falise, the plaintiffs were admitted
tortfeasors who in turn sought recovery from Tobacco entities as joint
167 See Regence Blueshield v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 99-35203, 2001 WL 205996 (9th
Cir. Feb. 28, 2001); Serv. Employees Int'l Union Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 249 F.3d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Lyons v. Philip Morris, Inc., 225 F.3d 909 (8th Cir.
2000); Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229 (2d
Cir. 1999); Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d
912 (3d Cir. 1999); E. States Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 729 N.Y.S.2d 240
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000); Steamfitters Local Union No. 614 Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip
Morris, Inc., No. W1999-0161-COA-R9-CV, 2000 WL 1390171 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 26,
2000). But see Serv. Employees Int'l Union Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 83
F. Supp. 2d 70 (D.D.C. 1999) (allowing a labor union health trust fund's RICO contribution claim against Tobacco to survive defendant's motion to dismiss), rev'd, 249 F.3d 1068
(D.C. Cir. 2001).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

1168

[Vol. 88:1142

tortfeasors. 168 In contrast, the plaintiffs who brought the other RICO
third-party contribution suits against Tobacco were insurance and
health-fund entities that never faced liability for the underlying tort
giving rise to their alleged third-party harm. 16 9
Viewing the Trust and Tobacco as joint tortfeasors sheds light on
a policy consideration that may have fueled Judge Weinstein's analysis. The Falise court's willingness to find sufficient proximate cause
may be due to the need for a system to apportion damages between
Tobacco and Asbestos. Judge Weinstein was keenly aware of the opportunity Falise presented to resolve the problem of liability apportionment for harms attributable to both asbestos and tobacco.
Indeed, he stated that "[a] llowing recovery in this action by the Trust
would substantially clarify in a single action both Tobacco's share and
17
the Trust's share of liability for Claimants' injuries...
This statement raises a broader question: is Judge Weinstein's approach desirable or does it approach the problem widdershins? More
specifically, should the fact that a party bringing a contribution claim
is a joint tortfeasor seeking recovery from another alleged joint
tortfeasor shift policy toward allowing such a claim to proceed under
171
RICO notwithstanding the "remoteness," "derivative," or "indirect"'
nature of the injury? Or should the fact that Asbestos and Tobacco
are two of the largest and most notorious toxic tort litigants play a role
in a court's analysis? What special consideration should there be for
two large mass tort litigants whose products arguably cause identical
harms? Moreover, what are the implications of allowing such a contribution claim to go forward? Lastly, to address these questions, we
must analyze the shortcomings of traditional contribution mechanisms between joint tortfeasors as applied to the asbestos-tobacco relationship involving a harm attributable to both toxins.
1.

Asbestos Defendants Assume Additional Liability for Lung Cancer
Attributable to Tobacco

Take the following hypothetical: an individual who was exposed
to asbestos began smoking before Congress mandated warnings for
tobacco products; subsequently, she developed lung cancer. 172 In the168 In rejecting the Tobacco defendants' double recovery argument, Judge Weinstein
noted that such an "argument fails because it neglects the relationship of the Tobacco
entities to the Trust: they are joint-tortfeasors." Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d
316, 344 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
169
See, e.g., Sem. Employees, 249 F.3d at 1068; Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 229; Steamfitters Local Union No. 420, 171 F.3d at 912.
170 Falise,94 F. Supp. 2d at 345.
171
See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
172 Congress enacted the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act in 1965. See
Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340
(2000)). Five years later, Congress amended the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
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ory, this individual could do any one of the following: (1) bring misrepresentation or failure-to-warn claims against Tobacco or Asbestos,
(2) bring these claims against both Tobacco and Asbestos, or (3)
bring only a defect claim sounding in strict products liability against
Asbestos.
In all likelihood, however, she will sue only the potential asbestos
defendants because litigating an asbestos claim is her most assured
option. 1 73 First, the causation hurdle is lower in asbestos litigation
because generally the only issue therein is product identificationthat is, whether the plaintiff had been exposed to a particular asbestos
product.1 74 Furthermore, proof of liability is more straightforward because an asbestos plaintiff also has the luxury of being able to sue in
strict liability on a product defect claim, as courts consider asbestos a
defective product. Under a strict liability regime, once a plaintiff
proves specific causation (that the plaintiff was exposed to a particular
defendant's product), the plaintiff recovers at least compensatory
7 5
damages.1
On the other hand, courts do not consider tobacco a defective
product'76-such

a conclusion would amount to categorical liability

for tobacco manufacturers. Therefore, in a tobacco action, plaintiffs
must resort to theories of conspiracy and misrepresentation on the
part of the tobacco industry to recover any damages. Unlike an asbestos action, simply proving that the plaintiff was exposed to tobacco is
insufficient for recovery.
1969, which barred radio and television advertising by tobacco companies. See Pub. L. No.
91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 87, 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (2000)).
173 Plaintiffs' large-scale success in suing the asbestos industry since the 1970s has yet
to be replicated in tobacco litigation. For example, although plaintiffs in individual tobacco failure-to-warn cases have achieved a 33% success rate at trial, see florida Man Wins
$165,000 Verdict Against RlJ. Reynolds, ANDREWS ASBESTOS LITIG. REP., Jan. 3, 2002, at 7, 7
[hereinafter Florida Verdict Against RJR], this pales in comparison to the success rate in
asbestos litigation.
174
It is well settled that asbestos causes ailments such as certain cancers, mesothelioma
and asbestosis. See THOMAS E. WILLGING, TRENDS IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION 9-10 (1987).
Richard Nagareda has noted that "[t]he existence of a link between asbestos and a host of
diseases is, by now, virtually indisputable as a general matter .. " Richard A. Nagareda,
Turningfrom Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 924 (1996).
This is not to say, however, that a defendant may not raise a state-of-the-art defense. See
D. RHEINGOLD, MASS TORT LITIGATION § 10:6 (1996). However, with respect to asbestos manufacturer defendants, overwhelming proof of industry knowledge of the dangers
and suppression of such knowledge is now well settled. Cf WILLGING, supra, at 7 (noting
that "industry knowledge ... of the health dangers associated with exposure to asbestos
fibers illustrate some of the causes of the asbestos litigation explosion").
175
See WILLGING, supra note 174, at 9 (noting that since the decision in Borel v.
FibreboardPaper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), "there has been little or no
dispute .. .that asbestos is an unreasonably dangerous product").
176 See Henderson & Twerksi, supra note 40.
PAUL
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Secondly, asbestos litigation has matured much more than tobacco litigation.17 7 Notably, it was not until the early 1990s that plaintiffs prevailed at trial against Tobacco on individual personal injury
claims. In stark contrast, even during the nascent years of asbestos
litigation, one study demonstrated a plaintiff success rate at trial of
fifty-three percent between 1980 and 1982.178 Tobacco plaintiffs have
79
only recently reached a thirty-three percent success rate at trial.'
Arguably, the transaction costs of actually litigating asbestos
claims are also less, making that option even more appealing to plaintiffs. Additionally, many jurisdictions and judges have special dockets
and longstanding case management orders streamlining the litigation
of asbestos actions and problems of proof.'5 0 Conversely, the breadth
of individual tobacco cases has yet to reach a level at which courts
have developed an expertise in efficiency measures.
All these reasons suggest that a plaintiff would not likely bring
action simultaneously against Asbestos and Tobacco. A plaintiff
would be ill-advised to complicate her prima facie case against Asbestos by introducing claims against Tobacco if the possibility of recovering against Asbestos alone is more assured and would nevertheless
result in the same damages as if she had sued both. Indeed, bringing
the lone asbestos claim rather than the tobacco claim at all appears to
be a more prudent maneuver.
Given this obvious strategic choice, what are Asbestos's options if
a smoker stricken with lung cancer claims that asbestos exposure is
the cause of her illness? In theory, Asbestos may utilize numerous
procedural methods to apportion liability, such as impleading Tobacco, bringing a separate contribution action against Tobacco, or defending on the basis of plaintiff fault, arguing that the plaintiff's
tobacco use "caused" the harm. However, because of Tobacco's special status and the nature of mass tort litigation, the first two optionsthe contribution actions-are not viable means of relief for Asbestos.""' Indeed, one can argue that Tobacco is an "immune nonparty"
in the context of asbestos personal-injury cases involving smokers. According to this line of reasoning, Tobacco is at least immune from
177
"The term 'mature' mass tort was coined by Francis McGovern to characterize repeat-injury litigation in which the sheer number of cases that had gone to trial established
the likely valuation of all subsequent claims." Samuel Issacharaoff, "Shocked": Mass Torts
and Aggregate Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1925, 1927 n.13

(2002) (citing Francis McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659,
659 (1989)).
178

See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., VARIATION IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND

EXPENSES 18-19 (1984).
179 See Florida Verdict Against RJR, sufra note 173, at 7.
18o

See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 23-26 (1995).

181

See supra Parts 1.B.1-1.B.2.
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contribution claims brought by a tortfeasor whose product has also
been linked to lung cancer.
Moreover, traditional contribution mechanisms are economically
unfeasible for the mass toxic-tort defendant. Given the large number
of claims pending in every jurisdiction, 82 Asbestos's incentive to settle
outweighs its incentive to take a claim to trial. In fact, trial is a rare
occurrence with asbestos claims. One empirical study of the disposition of asbestos cases in ten federal districts revealed that only five
percent of all asbestos cases went to trial, or that they were disposed of
8 3 In turn, settlement essentially nullifies any poon pretrial motions. 1
tential contribution claim an asbestos defendant might have had
18 4
against an alleged joint tortfeasor.
Even the last option-that of arguing a plaintiff's contributory
fault for smoking-proves troublesome for Asbestos. In the majority
ofjurisdictions, only a showing that asbestos "substantially caused" the
harm is necessary.' 85 Therefore, once a plaintiff proves above a fifty
percent likelihood that asbestos was the cause of his or her lung cancer, the asbestos defendants become fully liable regardless of any "enhanced" injury that tobacco use might have caused.' 8 6 Thus, the
asbestos defendant is left with only one method of recourse: seeking
contribution in a separate action. For the aforementioned reasons,
17
even this option is hardly viable.'
Although lawmakers founded contribution actions and apportionment on theories of equity, 8" asbestos defendants find that they
cannot avail themselves of the equities these mechanisms purportedly
afford. Surprisingly, this is so even in cases in which the asbestos de182

STEPHENJ. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVILJuSTIcE, ASBESTOS LITIGATION

(finding that "through the year
2000 over 600,000 claimants had filed against about 6,000 defendants").
183
See WILLGING, supra note 174, at 26.
184
Under UCATA and most state contribution statutes, a settling party may not re-

COSTS AND COMPENSATION: AN INTERIM REPORT 51 (2002)

cover from a non-settling party for any amount paid above its portion of liability. See supra
notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
185
See WEINSTEIN, supra note 180, at 151.
186
See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16 (1998)
(discussing "enhanced injury" liability).
187 See supra Part I.B.2.
188 SeeJean Macchiaroli Eggen, UnderstandingState ContributionLaws and Their Effect on
the Settlement of Mass Tort Actions, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1704 (1995) (noting that "[t]he
right of contribution evolved in equity" and the revisions of joint and several liability
"demonstrate a trend toward assuring that a defendant will be responsible for damages in
an amount that most closely approximates its proportionateequitable share of liability" (emphasis
added)); see also Michael D. Green, The UnanticipatedRipples of ComparativeNegligence: Superseding Cause in Products Liability and Beyond, 53 S.C. L. REv. 1103, 1119 (2002) ("Comparative fault and comparative contribution recognize the reality that many tortious acts may
concur to cause the same harm. While recognizing that reality, comparative methodology
also provides a mechanism for apportioning liability for the harm among all of the
tortfeasors in some rough approximation to the culpability of each.").
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fendants are armed with evidence demonstrating the "synergy" between tobacco and asbestos. Because of the strategic preference of
smoker-asbestos workers to sue Asbestos rather than Tobacco and the
lack of mechanisms available to a mass toxic-tort litigant such as Asbestos to recover contribution, the Trust in Falise is correct in opining
that it has been unfairly bearing a portion of Tobacco's liability for
quite some time.18s
2.

Why a Contribution Mechanism Is Necessary

As expressed above, because plaintiffs affirmatively choose to sue
Asbestos rather than Tobacco for a harm that is arguably attributable
to both toxins, and because courts are reluctant to allow juries to apportion harm between the two, Asbestos bears a disproportionate
share of liability. This results in inequities that are contrary to the
progressive principles of fairness inherent in modern comparative
negligence and contribution statutes.' 1 ° However, beyond the inequity problems, there are policy issues to consider. The disparate treatment of Asbestos leads to troubling extra-legal effects, such as the
current flood of bankruptcies among asbestos defendants,"" the increased transaction costs, and the siphoning of available funds for future plaintiffs.
The alarming increase of bankruptcies, including bankruptcies of
seemingly peripheral asbestos defendants, 9 2 correlates directly to increased transaction costs. In fact, if mechanisms were available to
properly apportion the liability between Asbestos and Tobacco, the
former would not bear the disproportionate liability and thus could
avoid the need for bankruptcy protection. Bankrupt asbestos defendants increase transaction costs by creating secondary litigation in the
bankruptcy courts.
Increased transaction costs due to the lack of contribution mechanisms are apparent in other ways. For instance, consider once again
the hypothetical smoker-asbestos plaintiff whose injury is lung cancer.
Suppose that such a plaintiff, because of product identification difficulties, brings action against Tobacco rather than suing Asbestos. Although it has already been shown that Asbestos may utilize a
contributory negligence defense based on the plaintiffs tobacco use
as the cause of injury, 19 : Tobacco's defense in the tobacco action will
189
190
191
192

See Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
See Part II.B.1.
See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
See CARROLL, supra note 182; Miel, supra note 9 (discussing the bankruptcy of Fed-

eral-Mogul, an automotive parts supplier that did not handle asbestos directly but, through
the acquisition of a subsidiary, became implicated in asbestos litigation).
193
See cases cited supra notes 23, 25-27, 29, 31.
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be to blame asbestos exposure as the cause of the injury. 19 4 Thus, as a
practical matter, the issue of liability as between Asbestos and Tobacco
is repeatedly litigated at the trial level. Such redundant litigation undoubtedly slows down the trial process, thereby increasing transaction
costs. Indeed, Judge Weinstein's suggestion in Falise that the Trust's
RICO action would "substantially clarify in a single action both Tobacco's share and the Trust's share of liability"' 95 does have merit.
Establishing the relative liability as between Asbestos and Tobacco in
one action under the synergy theory would undoubtedly diminish
transaction costs resulting from repeatedly litigating this issue
separately.
Probably the most troubling extra-legal effect stemming from the
lack of viable contribution mechanisms available to Asbestos is the reality of rapidly disappearing funds available to future plaintiffs. Judge
Weinstein noted this disturbing trend of bankruptcies among asbestos-related companies in his book, IndividualJustice in Mass Tort Litigation.196 In a passage discussing the pitfalls of adjudicating mass toxictort claims one by one, he argued:
If we persist in trying cases on an individual or even small-scale jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis, many plaintiffs will die before they are
compensated, a great many will wait years, and some may receive
nothing as the available monies are dribbled away by earlier awards
and transaction costs.'

97

Although in this passage Judge Weinstein is specifically advocating the
consolidation of mass toxic-tort actions, the underlying theme is that
inefficiencies result in insufficient funds to resolve all claims. Moreover, as the increasing number of bankruptcies illustrates, and the
above quote intimates, funds are actually dwindling at an expedited
rate.' 98 Ironically, the very fact that Asbestos brought a claim such as
the one in Falise not only indicates the dire situation, but the suit itself
also raises transactional costs and provides another example of a costincreasing, peripheral action.
Taken together, the combined effects of the lack of adequate
contribution devices available to Asbestos-the disproportionate assumption of liability and the inequities flowing therefrom, increased
transaction costs, and dwindling funds-necessitate pro-activity to find
194

See San FranciscoJury Spares Asbestos Defendant in Big Tobacco Case, ANDREWS

ASBESTOS

REP., Apr. 14, 2000, at 6, 6 (highlighting the case in which Tobacco defended on
grounds that asbestos exposure caused the plaintiff's lung cancer).
195
Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 345 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
196
WEINSTEIN, supra note 180, at 136-37.
197
Id. at 141.
198 See CARROLL, supra note 182; Miel, supra note 9 (citing Credit Suisse First Boston's
estimate that liability claims from asbestos exposure could reach as high as $50 billion total
for a group of 120 defendants).
LITIG.
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a solution. This is especially true because asbestos defendants are
armed with substantial evidence demonstrating the synergistic relationship between tobacco use and asbestos exposure. 199 Furthermore,
although this Note has focused on the narrow situation concerning
Asbestos and Tobacco, the development of remedies to address adequate contribution devices for Asbestos would prove relevant to other
mass-tort litigants.2 0 0 One can imagine other future mass toxic-tort
defendants in a similar predicament; namely, a situation in which, due
to a lag in scientific knowledge, the defendant learns either post-settlement or post-litigation that another toxin may have caused the harm
for which the litigant was found liable.
The next section concludes that the RICO solution illustrated in
Falise is a viable and innovative response to the mass toxic-tort litigant's contribution predicament.
3.

The Use of Civil RICO as an Innovative Alternative in Falise

In light of the considerations discussed above, 20 1 other courts
should follow Falise's lead and reinvigorate the traditional commonlaw notions of proximate cause to allow such claims to proceed. A
RICO action affords a viable vehicle to resolve the apportionment of
liability between Asbestos and Tobacco because: (1) notwithstanding
the seemingly narrow articulation of proximate cause under RICO,
proximate cause is a malleable principle subject to judicial discretion;
(2) even under RICO's conceptualization of proximate cause, Asbestos represents an appropriate party to vindicate the RICO claim; (3)
because of the singular nature of a RICO suit, the parties can litigate
liability between Tobacco and Asbestos in one action, thereby reducing transaction costs; and (4) the RICO action affords the only contribution relief currently available to Asbestos.
First, the Asbestos-Tobacco complexity justifies doing "what justice demands" and returning to traditional articulations of proximate
cause. That notion asserts that proximate legal cause is a discretionary doctrine. Even the court in LaborersLocal 17 noted that proximate
cause is "an elusive concept, one 'always to be determined on the facts
of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, jusSee supra Part I.B.
Other possible mass toxic-tort litigants include Lead Paint, Albuterol, and Bendectin. See generally RHEINGOLD, supra note 174, § 3:13-3:43 (discussing class action case
histories).
201
See supra Part III.A.4-B.2 (observing the inequities of not allowing apportionment
between two tortfeasors, despite substantial evidence that warrants apportionment, and the
resulting increase in transactional costs and detrimental extra-legal effects of disproportionate liability).
199
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tice, policy and precedent.' "202 Furthermore, "[a] t bottom... proximate cause reflects 'ideas of what justice demands ...
,"'203 These
articulations imply the inherently flexible nature of proximate cause,
under which principles of justice and policy factor into a court's
calculus of whether a claimant's injuries, are too remote. Whether
one follows the Harper and James articulation of proximate cause
(the unforeseeable risk of harm conceptualization) 20 4 or that of Prosser and Keeton (that proximate cause is a question of policy),205 both
articulations indicate the discretionary nature of a doctrine underpinned by notions of public policy. 20 6 Indeed, proximate cause analysis considers "whether... the law will extend... responsibility to the
consequences which have in fact occurred." 20 7 To make such a determination, courts invariably weigh a number of factors. 20 8 In short, the
unique facts of Falise, and the overwhelming policy considerations to
which it gives rise, 209 will compel courts to invoke their equitable discretionary powers and find adequate proximate cause.
Second, contrary to the holdings in RICO actions that involved
the Funds, 2 10 the Faliseplaintiffs represent an appropriate party to vindicate the claims of the more directly injured parties. A risk that the
Holmes-RICO-proximate-cause-limitation attempts to address is the
existence of more "directly injured parties who can remedy the [alleged] harm." 2 11 Yet, it is clear that the more "directly injured parties"
in Falise--the smoker-plaintiffs exposed to asbestos-do not have any
legal right to bring individual claims under RICO "because under the
statute, personal injuries are not recoverable."' 2 12 Therefore, the argument that Asbestos lacks standing, or is too remote a party to vindicate
the RICO claim against Tobacco, falls apart because the directly injured smokers and Trust claimants are themselves precluded from
bringing such a claim.
'

202

Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 235

(2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added) (quoting PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra

note 115, at 279).
203 Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) (quoting PROSSER &
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 115, at 264).
204
FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 167-69 (2d ed. 1986).
205

PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 115, at 273.

206

See supra Part IV.A.1, A.3.

207

PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS, supra note 115, at 273.

208

See supra Part III.A.1.

See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the consequences of the lack of contribution devices available to asbestos defendants).
210
See, e.g., Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d
209

229, 229 (2d. Cir. 1999).
211
Id. at 237; see also supra note 59 (summarizing the Holmes proximate cause
standard).
212
Mosesso, supra note 61, at 338 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
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Third, the use of a RICO action provides an efficient means of
settling apportionment issues. Both an extension of the statute of limitations on a contribution claim 2 1 3 for mass toxic-tort litigants, as well

as a legislative amendment to Tobacco's legal immunity, 214 appear to
resolve the inequity of disproportionate liability Asbestos has suffered.
The retooling of conventional contribution mechanisms would provide Asbestos adequate relief to vindicate its contribution claim under
the synergy theory of liability. 215 Such solutions, however, fail to ad-

dress the underlying dilemma of overburdensome transactional costs
because the issue of apportionment between Tobacco and Asbestos
would still be relitigated on a case-by-case basis. Conversely, as Judge
Weinstein suggested, a RICO action could be used to settle the apportionment issue in a single suit, thereby cutting transaction costs and
ultimately "providing greater relief to more victims ... [than would] ad
hoc litigation" in which "[el normous sums would be consumed in litigation costs that would otherwise be available for recovery" by the in2 6
jured smoker-asbestos plaintiffs. '
The argument against the use of RICO as a belated contribution
claim is that it allows Asbestos to sidestep the conventional limitations
of contribution actions 2 17 and legislatively enacted immunity statutes. 2 18 That such sidestepping is necessary rebuts this counterargument. The troubling state of asbestos litigation, and more generally,
the unique characteristics of the mass toxic-tort litigant, warrant a
fresh and innovative use of existing causes of action, such as civil
RICO, to reach equity-driven results. To quote Judge Weinstein:
Monstrous mega-mass tort litigations can be tamed. They must be
examined with a realistic eye, rather than romantic notions of how
the law and lawyers once operated when a tort involved only a private matter of two parties ... and a passive court. Ethical and legal
213

In general, the statute of limitations to bring a contribution claim is one to two

years in most jurisdictions.

See AMERICAN LAw OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 35,

§ 52:137, WL ALPL 52:137 (last updated Feb. 2003). Extending the statute of limitations
would be especially helpful to the mass toxic-tort litigant in light of the slow progress of
scientific knowledge, as the Falise facts illustrate. Indeed, knowledge of synergy between
toxins, as the asbestos defendants showed in Falise, did not develop until long after the
statute of limitations had tolled, thereby precluding contribution recovery.
214 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text (detailing the California immunity
statute for tobacco defendants).
215 See supra Part I.B.1-B.2 (addressing the barriers to conventional contribution devices that limit Asbestos's chances of contribution relief).
216 Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 346 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
217 See supra Part I.B.1-B.2 (discussing conventional contribution action
requirements).
218 See supra notes 32-34 (detailing the California immunity statute for tobacco defendants); see generally Vandall, supra note 45 (explaining the proposed settlement between

Tobacco and the states that offered exemption from future class action suits as a part of
settlement).
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norms out of touch with real life lead not to morality, but to hypoc2 19
risy, abuse, and waste.

As the above quotation intimates, passivity with regard to the reality of
the mass-tort situation leads to detrimental inefficiencies and waste.
The use of RICO as a contribution mechanism avoids such waste and
reduces the viscosity inherent in current conventional responses to
apportionment issues in an increasingly mass-tort world.
CONCLUSION

Without a resolution of the Asbestos-Tobacco apportionment
problem concerning injuries resulting from exposures to both toxins,
the problems of increased transaction costs and the resulting extralegal effects of bankruptcy and insufficient funds to pay claimants will
persist. Likewise, a party bearing a greater or lesser portion of its liability to the benefit or detriment of another party undermines the
fundamental premise of modern day comparative negligence and
contribution theories. Although unorthodox by strict civil RICO standards, the Faliserationale is an example of warranted judicial activism
and the appropriate use of a court's equitable powers to address a
complex legal quagmire.

219

WEINSTEIN,

supra note 180, at 171.

